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THE COLLEGE'S EMERGING DUTY TO
SUPERVISE STUDENTS: IN LOCO
PARENTIS IN THE 1990s
INTRODUCTION
The modern college campus is a dangerous place.' Students
frequently fall victim to criminal attacks such as rape and sexual
assault. 2 Alcohol consumption3 often leads to serious injury.4
1. According to a recent New York Times article:
An American college or university (enrollment ranges from under
100 students to 45,000 and more) averages three reported violent
assaults a year, eight incidents of hate crime or hazing violence,
430 property crimes and countless alcohol violations. Like much
off-campus crime, many more incidents go unreported. One in three
students will be the victim of some kind of campus crime. Estimates
on the number of women raped or sexually assaulted during their
college years range from 1 in 7 to I in 25.
Anne Matthews, The Campus Crime Wave, N.Y TiMEs, Mar. 7, 1993, § 6
(Magazine), at 38. Some commentators have even pointed to studies indicating
that the number of college women forced to engage in sexual acts against their
will is I in 4. Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast, Sept. 10, 1993)
(statement of Andrea Parrot, professor at Cornell University and authority on
on-campus violence against women).
2. See, e.g., Hartman v. Bethany College, 778 F. Supp. 286, 289 (N.D.
W. Va. 1991) (student assaulted by two men after leaving bar close to campus);
Tanja H. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 278 Cal. Rptr. 918, 919 (1991)
(student gang raped by football players living on her dormitory floor); Duarte
v. State, 148 Cal. Rptr. 804, 806 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (student raped and
murdered in residence hall), vacated, 151 Cal. Rptr. 727 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979);
Relyea v. State, 385 So. 2d 1378, 1380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (students
abducted from campus, then assaulted and murdered); Klobuchar v. Purdue
Univ., 553 N.E.2d 169, 170 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (student held at gunpoint by
deranged ex-husband); Nero v. Kansas St. Univ., 861 P.2d 768, 771-72 (Kan.
1993) (student raped by fellow dormitory resident); Mullins v. Pine Manor
College, 449 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Mass. 1983) (student raped by unknown intruder
on campus); Brown v. North Carolina Wesleyan College, 309 S.E.2d 701, 701
(N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (student abducted, raped, and murdered following on-
campus basketball game).
3. According to one commentator:
Even before they begin their first day of college, say many experts
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Under negligence law, the extent of the college's duty to protect
students from such misfortunes remains unclear.'
American colleges historically provided for the physical well-
being of their students. 6 This was derived from the traditional in
loco parentis student-college relationship. 8 During the 1900s,
on student life, a large number of undergraduates are messed-up,
increasingly adept (often since high school) at reckless drinking and
reckless sex, increasingly burdened by messy family histories, in-
creasingly unprepared for college course work.
Matthews, supra note 1, at 38, 47. The author noted that "intoxicated students
routinely smash toilets, yank out sinks, punch through ceilings, head-butt street
lamps, uproot ornamental trees and body-slam vending machines.. ." Id. at
42.
4. For cases involving injuries suffered by students, see Kleinknecht v.
Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360, 1363-64 (3d Cir. 1993) (student suffered
fatal heart attack during lacrosse practice); Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d
135, 137 (3d Cir. 1979) (student rendered paraplegic after car accident occurring
while passenger in car of classmate who had become intoxicated at class picnic),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980); Booker v. Lehigh Univ., 800 F. Supp. 234,
235-36 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (intoxicated student injured after falling and hitting her
head on a rock while taking wooded shortcut), aff'd mem., 995 F.2d 315 (3d
Cir. 1993); Rehberg v. Glassboro St. College, 745 F. Supp. 1113, 1114 (E.D.
Pa. 1990) (student injured in car accident after drinking at fraternity party);
Baldwin v. Zoradi, 176 Cal. Rptr. 809, 811 (1981) (student engaging in "speed
contest" injured in car accident after on-campus drinking); University of Denver
v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54, 56 (Colo. 1987) (en banc) (intoxicated student injured
while attempting a back flip on a trampoline); Furek v. University of Del., 594
A.2d 506, 510 (Del. 1991) (fraternity pledge injured during initiation event when
student poured oven cleaner over pledge's body); Walker v. Daniels, 407 S.E.2d
70, 72-73 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (student drowned in campus pool); Rabel v.
Illinois Wesleyan Univ., 514 N.E.2d 552, 554 (111. App. Ct. 1987) (female student
injured when an intoxicated individual dropped her while running with her on
his shoulder), cert. denied, 520 N.E.2d 392 (1988); Swanson v. Wabash College,
504 N.E.2d 327, 329 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (student injured by thrown baseball);
Campbell v. Board of Trustees, 495 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)
(passenger in automobile driven by intoxicated student injured when automobile
crashed into ditch); Pitre v. Louisiana Tech Univ., 596 So. 2d 1324, 1332 (La.
Ct. App. 1992) (student crashed into light pole while sledding on university
hill); Millard v. Osborne, 611 A.2d 715 (Pa. Super. Ct.) (intoxicated student
killed in automobile accident following fraternity party), cert. denied, 615 A.2d
1312 (Pa. 1992); Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986)
(student injured after falling off of a cliff while intoxicated).
5. See Amy Stevens, Personal-Injury Lawsuits by Students are Endangering
University Budgets, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1992, at Bi. Stevens noted that
recent court cases have left university administrators unsure of their legal
responsibilities regarding student safety. Id.
6. See Brian Jackson, Note, The Lingering Legacy of In Loco Parentis:
An Historical Survey and Proposal for Reform, 44 VAND. L. Rnv. 1135, 1138-
40 (1992) (describing the traditional custodial relationship between the student
and college). See also infra part I.B.
7. Black's Law Dictionary defines in loco parentis as: "[I]n the place of a
parent; instead of a parent; charged, factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties,
and responsibilities." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 787 (6th ed. 1990).
8. For a discussion of the in loco parentis relationship, see infra part I.B.https://opensch larship.wustl.edu/law_urba law/vol46/iss1/10
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colleges began to abandon this role and by 1970, in loco parentis
seemed defunct. 9 Since then, courts have widely held that the
demise of in loco parentis justifies the refusal to hold colleges
responsible for protecting and supervising students. 0
This trend began to reverse in the 1980s, when some courts
recognized a duty to protect students from on-campus criminal
attacks." In the 1990s, however, some courts have recognized a
broader duty, essentially a responsibility to protect students from
their own reckless behavior, and from the reckless and often
criminal acts of their classmates. 12 A duty to supervise students,
not just to protect students, is emerging in the 1990s.
This has left college administrators uncertain regarding what
responsive measures to institute. 3 Most, however, have responded
by increasing student supervision and restricting dangerous activ-
ities.' 4 Students, meanwhile, continue to file personal injury law-
suits against colleges in growing numbers. 5
9. See, e.g., Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 286 (D. Colo. 1968)
(noting that "the doctrine of 'In Loco Parentis' is no longer tenable in a
university community"); see generally WrLLIAm A. KAPL1N, THE LAW OF HIGHER
EDUCATION 5-7 (2d ed. 1985) (outlining factors leading to the demise of the in
loco parentis doctrine); Jackson, supra note 6, at 1142-44 (same); Theodore C.
Stamatakos, Note, The Doctrine of In Loco Parentis, Tort Liability and the
Student-College Relationship, 65 IND. L.J. 471, 474-76 (1991) (same). See
generally infra notes 33-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the demise
of in loco parentis.
10. See James J. Szablewicz & Annette Gibbs, Colleges' Increasing Exposure
to Liability: The New In Loco Parentis, 16 J.L. & EDUC. 453, 456-57 (1987)
(noting that "courts rejected negligence claims against colleges" after the demise
of the in loco parentis doctrine); Timothy M. McClean, Note, Tort Liability of
Colleges and Universities for Injuries Resulting From Student Alcohol Con-
sumption, 14 J.C. & U.L. 399, 402 (1987) (noting that the establishment of a
duty poses the most significant obstacle towards establishing a prima facie case
of negligence for the failure to control student alcohol consumption). See infra
part II.
11. See infra part III.
12. According to the Wall Street Journal, these new decisions deviating from
the accepted view stem "from renewed judicial ambivalence over whether college
students are fully accountable adults or kids who need protection form them-
selves." Stevens, supra note 5, at Bl. See generally infra part IV.
13. The Wall Street Journal noted that institutions are without "clear legal
guidelines" and "uncertain" as to when they might be accountable for injuries
to students. Stevens, supra note 5, at BI. See also McClean, supra note 10, at
413 (noting that recent decisions create a dilemma because they hold colleges to
a duty to enforce their protective policies, making it prudent not to institute
such policies).
14. See Clampdowns Cause Different Problems, U.S.A. TODAY, Apr. 8,
1991, at 50 [hereinafter Clampdowns] ("While colleges investigate new ways to
curb drinking through education, the threat of lawsuits has them redoubling
old-fashioned efforts to monitor underage drinkers or ban alcohol from cam-
puses."); Kathryn Kranhold & Katherine Farrish, Anxiety About Sex, Dating,
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This Note discusses th emerging duty of colleges to supervise
students under the in loco parentis theory.' 6 Part I discusses the
student-college relationship, focusing on the traditional in loco
parentis relationship, and briefly examining contractual methods
of determining the relationship. Part II examines cases that limit
the duty of colleges. Part III addresses cases that have imposed
on colleges a duty to provide adequate security on campus. Part
IV examines recent cases in the 1990s that have imposed on
colleges a broader duty to monitor students in an effort to protect
them. Finally, Part V analyzes the emerging duty to supervise in
terms of traditional tort duty analysis, and discusses policy factors
that may be guiding these courts. This section concludes that
recent attempts to impose supervisory responsibilities on the
college should be embraced with caution.
I. TnE STUDENT-COLLEGE RELATIONSHIM
A. Duty and Negligence Law
"Duty" is an element of the prima facie negligence case.',
Whether a duty is owed is a question of law.'" Common-law
Rape Transforms College Life, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 10, 1993, at AI ("[I]n
response to ... fear of lawsuits ... [colleges] are adopting increasingly intrusive
policies."); Matthews, supra note 1, at 38, 47 (noting "newfound paternalism"
as a result of increased liability); CNN & Company (CNN television broadcast,
Apr. 5, 1993) (noting "new paternalism" in american colleges and universities)
[hereinafter CNN & Company].
15. The Wall Street Journal described a "new wave of personal-injury suits
by students, many of whom claim the schools should have protected them from
their own youthful mistakes." See Stevens, supra note 5, at BI. Personal injury
suits against universities have "risen significantly" in the last five years. As a
result, most schools now employ full time legal staffs. Id. at B6. William
Kaufman, Vice President and General Counsel of the University of Alaska,
Fairbanks, noted that, "There appears to be a greater tendency for people to
look to the university for compensation for any injury, regardless if the matter
was wholly in the control of the individual." Id.
The increase in lawsuits against colleges can also be seen as a by-product of
the general litigation explosion. See Stamatakos, supra note 6, at 488 (noting
that colleges have not been immune "from the general expansion of tort liability
that has occurred over the last twenty-five years"). The litigation explosion
began in the 1960s partially as a result of the increased willingness of courts to
recognize new bases of liability. See Peter H. Schuck, Introduction to Ti
AMERicAN ASSEMBLY, TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 19 (Peter H. Schuck
ed., 1991).
16. This Note does not discuss numerous other theories on which a student
can posit liability against a college, such as the affirmative negligence of the
college, agency principles, or intentional torts. Additionally, this Note does not
address the college's possible liability under dram shop statutes or under social
host liability.
17. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTShttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/10
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negligence differentiates between active negligence, or misfea-
sance, and passive negligence, or nonfeasance. 9 The failure of
the university to protect or supervise its students is nonfeasance,
or the failure to take affirmative action. 20 There can be no duty
to take affirmative action without the existence of a "special
relationship" between the parties, a relationship that the law
recognizes as warranting an exception from the general rule.2'
In addition to the existence of a special relationship, a duty to
take affirmative action requires a finding that non-action creates
a foreseeable and unreasonable risk. 22 To determine whether a
§ 30, at 164 (5th ed. 1984). Under the traditional approach to negligence, four
elements compose a negligence cause of action: (1) a duty, or obligation,
recognized by the law, requiring the actor to conform to a certain standard of
conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks; (2) a failure
on the actor's part to conform to that standard, or a breach of the duty; (3)
an injury resulting from that breach; and (4) a reasonably close causal connection
between the injuries and the breach. KE-ON, supra, § 30, at 164-65. The
negligence framework can also be discussed in terms of duty-risk analysis. See
E. Wayne Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational
Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. Rv. 1, 22-32.
18. KEEmON, supra note 17, § 45, at 320.
19. Id. § 56, at 373. The common law distinguishes between active negligence,
misfeasance (e.g., driving carelessly) and non-active negligence, nonfeasance
(e.g., failing to come to the aid of an injured party whose injuries the actor
did not cause). Id. § 56, at 363-75.
20. See, e.g., University of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54, 57 (Colo.
1987) (en banc) ("University is charged with negligent failure to act rather than
negligent affirmative action.").
21. See KEEToN, supra note 17, § 56, at 363-75. The misfeasance/nonfeasance
distinction is rooted in the refusal of early courts to hold persons liable for
non-action. Id. § 56, at 373. English judges "shrank from converting the courts
into an agency for forcing men to help one another." Id. According to Prosser
and Keeton, "[D]uring the last century, liability for 'nonfeasance' has been
extended still further to a limited group of relations, in which custom, public
sentiment and views of social policy have led the courts to find a duty of
affirmative action." Id. § 56, at 373-74.
Section 314A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts lists special relationships
that courts have commonly accepted as allowing a duty to protect another. The
list, which the Restatement states does not preclude the finding of other special
relationships, includes: the common carrier and passenger; the innkeeper and
guest; the possessor of land and invitee; and the custodian and ward. RESTATE-
iNrr (S~coND) oF ToRTs § 314(a) (1965).
The Restatement lists additional relationships that allow a duty to supervise
third parties. They include: the duty of parents to control their children; the
duty of masters to control their servants; the duty of possessors of land or
chattels to control the conduct of licensees; the duty of those in charge of
persons having dangerous propensities; and the duty of persons having custody
of another to control the conduct of third persons. Id. §§ 316-320.
22. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) ("The
risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed."); KEEToN, supra
note 17, § 31, at 170.
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risk is unreasonable, courts weigh the gravity and probability of
the harm associated with such non-action against the societal
burdens that correspond with imposing such responsibilities.Y
Accordingly, duty is essentially a policy question. 24 Because duty
has its foundation in policy concerns, the analysis changes with
social norms.5
B. In Loco Parentis
Early American educational institutions26 emphasized discipline
and structure. 27 Courts granted to colleges great deference in
23. According to section 291 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as
involving a risk of harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and
the act is negligent if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh
what the law regards as the utility of the act or of the particular
manner in which it is done.
RMSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965). Comment f. to section 291
specifically applied this test to finding a duty to take affirmative action:
Even where the relationship or precedent act is one which usually
creates a duty of protective action, no such duty exists if the benefit
to the other is less than, or merely equal to, the utility of action
or inaction to the actor.
Id. § 291, cmt. f. The Restatement further set out factors to be considered in
determining the utility of the affirmative action and risk of non-action..See id.
§§ 292-293; infra notes 214 & 224. See also Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976). In Tarasoff, the court explained thatjudges should only depart from the traditional rule of non-liability for nonfea-
sance:
[U]pon the balancing of a number of considerations; major ones
are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing
future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and con-
sequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care
with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost and
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
Id. (citations omitted).
24. "Duty is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum
total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff
is entitled to protection." KmoN, supra note 17, § 53, at 358.
25. Id. § 43, at 359.
26. The founders of the first American colleges emulated English institu-
tions. Jackson, supra note 6, at 1139. Graduates of and teachers from the
Cambridge and Emmanuel Colleges in England founded early American insti-
tutions. Id. at n.22.
27. Gerard A. Fowler, The Legal Relationship Between the American College
Student and the College: An Historical Perspective and the Renewal of a
Proposal, 13 J.L. & EDUC. 401, 408-09 (1984). Other authors describe a
particularly harsh system of punishment in the early years of H4arvard College:
"Mistress Eaton and her servants made domestic life unbearable for the freshmenhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/10
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formulating these restrictive policies, reasoning that colleges func-
tioned in loco parentis, or in the place of the students' parents. 28
Accordingly, courts blocked attempts to question the college's
power, much as they would restrict a minor's attempt to sue his
parents.29
In loco parentis was also characterized by a custodial relation-
ship between the college and the student.30 College administrators
exercised a parental role in securing the "physical and moral
welfare" of their students.3' It is unclear, however, whether in
loco parentis provided a basis for a tort duty during its heyday. 2
who boarded in with her, and Master Eaton ruined the 'scholastic' side of
freshman living by flogging the young men for disciplinary lapses." M. LEE
UPcRAPr & Jom N. GARDNER, Tm FRssA YEAR EXPERIENCE 29 (1989)
(citation omitted).
28. See, e.g., John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 102 So. 637, 640 (Fla. 1924)
(deferring to university judgment when confronted by student allegation that
university expelled him without cause and in bad faith); Gott v. Berea College,
161 S.W. 204, 206 (Ky. 1913) (noting that courts should grant great deference
to university authorities unless the university policies are unlawful or against
public policy); Woods v. Simpson, 126 A. 882, 883 (Md. 1924) (stating that the
college administration must "be left untrammeled in handling the problems
which arise, as their judgment and discretion may dictate. . . ."); see also Paul
D. Carrington, On Civilizing University Discipline, in LAW AND IsDSdm'NE ON
CAMPus 71 (Grace W. Holmes ed., 1971) ("Academic discipline used to be a
cozy, family affair. The benign dean played the firm, fair father; his students,
like good children everywhere, never questioned his integrity or his wisdom.").
For a definition of in loco parentis, see supra note 7. Blackstone applied in
loco parentis to the educational context in 1770 as follows:
[The father] may also delegate part of his parental authority ...
to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco
parentis, and has such portion of the power of the parent committed
to his change, viz. that of restraint and correction, as may be
necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed.
1 W.LiAM BLAcKSTONE, CommNTARmS '441.
29. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton College, 40 Ill. 186, 187
(1866) ("A discretionary power had been given [college authorities] to regulate
the discipline of their college in such manner as they deem proper .... [w]e
have no more authority to interfere than we have to control the domestic
discipline of a father in his family.") (emphasis added).
30. Stamatakos, supra note 9, at 474; Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note 10,
at 454 (noting that during the in loco parentis period, when parents placed
"their children in the college's hands, parents transferred their parental authority
and obligations to the schools").
31. See, e.g., Gott v. Berea College, 161 S.W. 204, 206 (Ky. 1913) ("College
authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and moral welfare...
of the pupils .... "). In Gott, the plaintiff, who owned a saloon near the
college, sought to enjoin enforcement of a rule that made patronage of his
establishment an expellable offense for students. The court deferred to the
college's parental decision making responsibilities. Id. at 207.
32. Few opinions written during the time of in loco parentis discussed college
tort liability, and none of these cases mentioned in loco parentis. One commen-
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In loco parentis began to decline in popularity in the late
nineteenth century when the German model of higher education
emerged. 33 German higher education envisioned large and diver-
sified institutions, and exhibited little concern for the private life
of the student.34 In the early twentieth century, state institutions
embraced this idea because it allowed them to educate a larger
student body.35 German education increased in popularity after
World War II because it allowed institutions to accommodate the
soldiers sent to college on the G.I. Bill.16 Enrollment increases
tator suggested that the doctrine of in loco parentis never provided the "special
relationship necessary for liability to obtain." Stamatakos, supra note 9, at 483.
This author executed a series of LEXIS searches, "using various combinations
of 'colleges,' 'universities,' 'in loco parentis,' and 'injury,"' all of which failed
to find any cases discussing in loco parentis in conjunction with college tort
liability. Id. at 483 n.62.
Nevertheless, other commentators have asserted that the lack of appellate
cases does not prove that the doctrine was inapplicable in tort. Szablewicz &
Gibbs, supra note 10, at 455-56. According to these authors:
The Gott definition of in loco parentis was qualified with an "unless
against public policy" stipulation. Until recently courts felt that
damage awards against colleges and universities drained the financial
resources of such institutions and that such a drain was against
public policy. Thus, the shortage of old cases discussing in loco
parentis as a basis of liability comes as no surprise. This issue was
never reached by most appellate courts because of the preemptory
immunity issue.
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
The immunity doctrines mentioned by Szablewicz and Gibbs limit judgments
against certain institutions. Such doctrines vary between states. Sovereign im-
munity doctrines often protect state institutions, while charitable immunity
doctrines often protect private institutions. Most jurisdictions, however, now
limit such immunities. See generally Janet Fairchild, Annotation, Tort Immunity
of NonGovernmental Charities - Modern Status, 25 A.L.R.4th 517 (1983);
Allen E. Korpela, Annotation, Modern Status of Doctrine of Sovereign Im-
munity as Applied to Public Schools and Institutions of Higher Learning, 33
A.L.R.3d 703 (1970) (citing sovereign immunity doctrines).
33. Jackson, supra note 6, at 1141-42.
34. Id. German higher education had its debut in the United States in 1876
when Johns Hopkins University was founded. According to Jackson, the students
at Johns Hopkins "were remarkably free of paternalistic control, the curriculum
was mostly elective, and students generally were unsupervised." Id. at 1142.
The University of Chicago, founded in 1889, was another major institution to
follow the German model. Id. at 1142 n.46. German education envisioned the
large "university," whereas the English model embraced the smaller "college"
setting. Id. at 1140-42.
35. Id. at 1142.
36. KAPijN, supra note 9, at 6. In 1940, there were approximately 1.5 million
degree students in institutions of higher education in the United States. This
number increased to 2.5 million in 1955, a 66% increase. By 1965, more than
5.5 million students were enrolled. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/10
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resulting from the baby boom further contributed to the popu-
larity of the German model.17
Student protest during the 1960s ended traditional in loco
parentis.A Students demanded additional freedoms and rights.39
The courts responded by refusing to grant deference to uncon-
stitutional university rules.40 Courts and commentators soon con-
cluded that in loco parentis no longer characterized the student-
college relationship. 4' In 1971, Congress enacted the Twenty-sixth
37. See id. (noting the increase in college students in the 1960s as a result
of the baby boom).
38. See generally Jackson, supra note 6, at 1143; Stamatakos, supra note 9,
at 474-76.
39. Jackson, supra note 6, at 1143.
40. Students' disobedience led to confrontations with university officials. See
Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note 10, at 456. One clash occurred at the University
of California when the administration tried to stop students from political
protest on campus. Jackson, supra note 6, at 1143. As a result, students who
had worked during previous summers for the civil rights cause organized the
"Free Speech Movement." Id. at 1143 & n.55. According to Jackson, the civil
rights activists had "returned to campus unwilling to accept restrictions on their
own political rights." Id. at 1143 n.55. See generally Donald A. Reidhaar, The
Assault on the Citadel: Reflections on a Quarter Century of Change In the
Relationships Between the Student and the University, 12 J.C. & U.L. 343, 347
(1985) (discussing origins of student protests during the 1960s); MICHAEL CLAY
SunmH, CoPiNG WrrH Cimi oN CAMPus 8-9 (1988) ("By the late 1960s, thousands
of criminal cases were in the courts growing out of 'sit-ins' and other sorts of
student demonstrations in support of political ideology.") (footnote omitted).
The Fifth Circuit, in Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Ed., 294 F.2d 150 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961), provided a turning point in the rejection
of in loco parentis. The Dixon court explicitly rejected traditional deference to
the university and held that state-run institutions could not expel students without
a hearing. Id. at 158. In Dixon, a state university had expelled two students
because they had participated in civil rights demonstrations. Id. at 151, 152 n.3.
The court rejected the contention that a public school could rely on traditional
deference to the college, and found that the school's policies violated the
students' due process rights. Id. at 157-58. See generally William W. Van
Alstyne, The Tentative Emergence of Student Power in the United States, 17
AM. J. Con. L. 403, 412 (1969) (referring to Dixon as "[t]he watershed
decision" in the demise of in loco parentis).
Other courts have solved student-college disputes by analyzing the constitu-
tional rights of the student. This method of analysis is limited, however, because
it only applies to public colleges, and is generally not relevant to determining a
duty relationship. See H.L. Silets, Of Students' Rights and Honor: The Appli-
cation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Strictures to Honor Code
Proceedings at Private Colleges and Universities, 64 DENy. U. L. REV. 46 (1987);
Stamatakos, supra note 9, at 476 n.23.
41. See, e.g., Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 286 (D. Colo. 1968)
(stating that in loco parentis is "no longer tenable"); Hegel v. Langsam, 273
N.E.2d 351, 352 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971) (holding that the university is "neither
a nursery school, a boarding school nor a prison.... [Students] must be
presumed to have sufficient maturity to conduct their own personal affairs.").
Commentators have also almost uniformly proclaimed the in loco parentis
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Amendment, which lowered the voting age to eighteen.4 2 This
appeared to reflect a societal view that college-aged students
should be treated as adults.43
C. The Student-College Contractual Relationship
Courts also use contract principles to examine the student-
college relationship.M Courts have found representations made by
colleges concerning conduct, academics, and discipline enforceable
because of implicit contractual agreements. 45 Implied contracts
can arise from representations in catalogues, bulletins, housing
contracts, registration materials, and admission applications.46
Courts reason that these representations are part of the bargain
between the parties. 47
The application of contract principles in this context, however,
suffers from analytical flaws. 48 Professor Virginia Dodd suggested
that such contracts do not result from a true bargain. 49 Dodd
argued that materials such as catalogues and bulletins are not
drafted to be contracts.5 0 Such representations are vague and
easily changed.5
relationship defunct. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Henry F. Reichner, Is the In
Loco Parentis Doctrine Dead?, 15 J.L. & EDUC. 271, 281-82 (1986) (noting that
in loco parentis, in the college context, "has undergone a clear rise and a
complete demise" in American courts).
42. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXVI.
43. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing
the 26th Amendment as evidence that society considers college-aged students to
be adults), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980). The enactment of the Twenty-
sixth Amendment prompted Justice Douglas to proclaim that, "Students-who,
by reason of the Twenty-sixth Amendment, become eligible to vote when 18
years of age-are adults who are members of the college or university com-
munity." Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 197 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
44. For a discussion of the application of contract law to the university-
student relationship, see Jonathan F. Buchter, Note, Contract Law and the
Student-University Relationship, 48 IND. L.J. 253 (1973).
45. See id. at 256-57 nn. 17-21 (citing cases employing contractual principles
to settle disputes).
46. For cases in which various documents and communications have given
rise to an implied contract, see id. at 256-57 nn. 17-21.
47. See, e.g., Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 449 N.E.2d 331, 336 (Mass.
1983) ("students are charged, either through their tuition or a dormitory fee,
for [protection from criminal acts]. Adequate security is as an indispensable
part of the bundle of services which colleges ... afford their students.").
48. See Virginia J. Dodd, The Non-Contractual Nature of the Student-
University Contractual Relationship, 33 KAN. L. REv. 701 (1985).
49. Id. at 704.
50. Id. at 714.
51. Id. at 715, 728-29.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/10
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II. Tm GENERAL RuLE: THE LIMITED DUTY OF THE COLLEGE
Since the demise of in loco parents, most courts have refused
to hold the college responsible for protecting students, 52 generally
on the grounds that no in loco parentis relationship exists. 53 In
52. See generally infra notes 54-100. No court, however, has held that
colleges cannot owe any duty towards their students. Because students are
typically business invitees, universities have a duty to protect students against
certain physical hazards on campus. For example, in Shannon v. Washington
Univ., 575 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978), the plaintiff sued the university
after slipping on an icy walkway on campus. Id. at 236-37. The court, accepting
the student as an invitee, acknowledged that a private university had a duty to
exercise ordinary care to keep those areas intended for the use of the invitee in
a reasonably safe condition. Id. at 237. See KEaToN, supra note 17, §§ 60-64,
at 412-50.
While some states have eliminated such distinctions, most jurisdictions classify
those who enter upon land into three categories: trespassers, licensees, and
invitees. Id. § 58, at 393. Further, the law has subdivided these categories. Id.
A trespasser enters the land without privilege of consent. Id. A licensee can be
described as someone who has entered the land with consent, but for his own
purpose, and not for the purpose or interest of the landholder. Id. § 60, at
412. Traveling salesmen who come unsolicited to the door of the landholder
and social guests are licensees. Id. § 60, at 413. Invitees generally include those
consensually allowed on the premises for business that concerns the occupier,
and upon the express or implied invitation of the occupier. Id. § 61, at 419.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts lists the generic landowner/invitee rela-
tionship as a special relationship. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 314A(3)
(1965). Specifically, in § 344, the Restatement says:
Business Premises Open to Public: Acts of Third Persons or Ani-
mals: A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry
for his business purposes is subject to liability to members of the
public while they are upon the land from such a purpose, for
physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally
harmful acts of third persons or animals, and by the failure of the
possessor to exercise reasonable care to (a) discover that such acts
are being done or are likely to be done, or (b) give a warning
adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to
protect them against it.
Id. §344.
53. Plaintiffs who allege that the college has a duty to exercise reasonable
care to protect students from various safety risks often allege an in loco parentis
relationship as a basis for such a duty. Such a relationship has been analogized
to § 314A(4) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states:
Special Relations Giving Rise to Duty to Aid or Protect:
(4) One ... who voluntarily takes the custody of another under
circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal opportu-
nities for protection is under a ... duty to the other.
Id. § 314A(4).
Similarly, in loco parentis has been analogized to § 320 of the Restatement,
which states:
Duty of Person Having Custody of Another to Control Conduct
19941
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Hegel v. Langsam,54 a case decided soon after the demise of in
loco parentis, an Ohio court refused to hold the college to a duty
to monitor the non-academic activities of its students." In Hegel,
the plaintiffs, the parents of a delinquent female student, claimed
that the university administration negligently allowed their daugh-
ter to become involved in an unacceptable lifestyle.16 In dismissing
the case, the court held that society presumed university students
mature and capable of supervising their own affairs . 7
In 1979, in Bradshaw v. Rawlings,5" the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the demise of in loco parentis drastically
limited the colleges duty to protect its students.5 9 Bradshaw, a
of Third Persons
One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the
custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the other
of his normal power of self-protection or to subject him to asso-
ciation with persons likely to harm him, is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care so to control the conduct of third persons as to
prevent them from intentionally harming the other or so conducting
themselves as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to him, if the
actor
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control
the conduct of the third persons, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for
exercising such control.
Id. § 320. Thus, the college would have a duty to supervise the entire student
body to protect its students. Similarly, an in loco parentis relationship could be
analogized to § 316 of the Restatement. Section 316 states:
Duty of Parent to Control Conduct of Child: A parent is under a
duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his minor child as to
prevent it from intentionally harming others or from so conducting
itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if
the parent
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control
his child, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for
exercising such control.
Id. § 316.
54. 273 N.E.2d 351 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971).
55. Id. at 352.
56. Id. According to the plaintiffs, the college allowed the student to
"become associated with criminals, to be seduced, to become a drug user and
further allowed her to be absent from her dormitory and failed to return her
to her parents' custody on demand." Id.
57. Id. The court stated that "[w]e know of no requirement of the law ...
placing on a university or its employees any duty to regulate he private lives of
their students, to control their comings and goings and to supervise their
associations." Id.
58. 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980).
59. Id. at 139-40. For student commentary on Bradshaw, compare Rita
Mankovich Irani, Recent Decisions, Torts-Negligent Supervision-College Li-
ability-Student Intoxication Injury, 19 DUQ. L. REv. 381 (1981) (approving ofhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/10
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student, sued his college after receiving injuries in an automobile
accident.60 The plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile being
driven back to campus by a fellow student.6 ' The driver had
become intoxicated at an off-campus school picnic.62 A jury found
the university negligent in its planning and supervision of the
event. 3 The college appealed, alleging that it had no duty to
supervise the driver or the activities at the picnic.6
The Third Circuit reversed.65 The court reasoned that "the
modern American college is not an insurer of the safety of its
students.""6 The court noted that college students demanded
freedom from oppressive rules in the 1960s. 7 As a result, society
now accorded broad responsibilities to college students."
The court also refused to find that university regulations ban-
ning alcohol use created an ensuing obligation of enforcement. 69
the decision), with Note, The Student-College Relationship and the Duty of
Care: Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 14 GA. L. REv. 843 (1980) (criticizing the opinion
as allowing too broad of a liability shield for universities).
60. Bradshaw was paralyzed after an automobile in which he was a passenger
struck a parked car. The driver of the automobile was speeding. The driver
attempted to negotiate a road filled with drainage dips used to carry surface
runoff. Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 137. The accident rendered Bradshaw a quad-
riplegic. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. A faculty member had participated in the planning of the event and
had co-signed a check used to purchase alcohol. The planners of the event
publicized the event throughout campus. Flyers "were mimeographed by the
college duplicating facility and featured drawings of beer mugs." No faculty
members, however, attended the picnic. Id.
63. Id. The jury ordered the university to pay the plaintiffs $1,108,067. Id.
64. Id.
65. Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 142-43.
66. Id. at 138.
67. Id. at 139. The court noted that, "A dramatic reapportionment of
responsibilities and social interests of general security took place [with the demise
of in loco parentis]. Regulation by the college of student life on and off campus
has become limited.... Moday students vigorously claim the right to define
and regulate their own lives." Id. at 139-40.
68. Id. at 138-39. The court, exercising diversity jurisdiction and applying
Pennsylvania law, examined the rights that Pennsylvania afforded to college age
students:
College students today are no longer minors; they are now regarded
as adults in almost every phase of community life ... [t]hey may
vote, marry, make a will, qualify as a personal representative, serve
as a guardian of the estate of a minor, wager at racetracks, register
as a public accountant, practice veterinary medicine, qualify as a
practical nurse, drive trucks, ambulances and other official fire
vehicles, perform general fire fighting duties, and qualify as a private
detective.
Id. at 139 (footnotes omitted).
69. Id. at 141. The regulation stated: "Possession or consumption of alcohol
or malt beverages on the property of the College or at any College sponsored
or related affair off campus will result in disciplinary action." Id.
19941
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The court reasoned that this regulation mirrored the state drinking
age law, and was not an enforceable agreement. 70 The college
could not reasonably have expected the plaintiff to rely on the
alcohol ban for his protection.7 1
Moreover, the court found that the college, through failing to
monitor the drinking, did not create a known probability of harm
giving rise to a duty.72 The court reasoned that student alcohol
consumption was relatively harmless.73 The court pointed to the
lack of any ban on printed and broadcasted beer advertisements,
and even seemed to invoke personal experience.7 4 Moreover, the
court held that supervisory obligations would create impossible
burdens.7 -
Most courts after Bradshaw refused to hold colleges to a duty
to protect students. 76 In Baldwin v. Zoradi," a California appellate
70. Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 141.
71. Id. The court applied § 320 of the Restatement. Id. at 141. See supra
note 53 for the text of § 320.
72. Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 141. The court reasoned in part that because
Pennsylvania law did not recognize social host liability, it could not hold the
college to such a duty. Id.
73. Id. at 142. According to the court, "it cannot be seriously controverted
that a goodly number of citizens indulge in this activity." Id.
74. Id. The court stated that "this panel of judges is able to bear witness
to the fact that beer drinking by college students is a common experience." Id.
75. Id. at 142. The court referred to such an obligation as an "impossible
burden." Id. In discussing the difficulty with enforcing such regulations, the
court noted that New Jersey, a bordering state, had a lower drinking age, thus
making alcohol an easy commodity for the underage drinkers at the college to
obtain. Id.
76. See Albano v. Colby College, 822 F. Supp. 840, 841 (D. Maine 1993)
(finding no duty to prevent adult college student from becoming intoxicated on
school-sponsored field trip); Booker v. Lehigh Univ., 800 F. Supp. 234, 241
(E.D. Pa. 1992) (finding no duty to monitor student drinking at fraternity
house), aff'd mem., 995 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1993); Hartman v. Bethany College,
778 F. Supp. 286, 291-95 (N.D. W. Va. 1991) (holding that school had no duty
to supervise and take action to prevent underage plaintiff from attempting to
patronize off-campus bars); Tanja H. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 278 Cal.
Rptr. 918, 920-21 (Ct. App. 1991) (noting several policy reasons not to find
that university had a duty to safeguard its students); Baldwin v. Zoradi, 176
Cal. Rptr. 809, 813-21 (Ct. App. 1981) (finding no duty to take action to
control dormitory drinking); University of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54,
56-62 (Colo. 1987) (en band) (finding no duty on part of college as either arising
from custodial position towards students, or as landlord to fraternity house, to
supervise potentially dangerous activity on trampoline located at fraternity
house); Savannah College of Art & Design v. Roe, 409 S.E.2d 848, 849-50
(holding that dormitory lease agreement did not give rise to a special protective
relationship); Walker v. Daniels, 407 S.E.2d 70, 75 (Ga. 1991) (finding no duty
to have provided lifeguard where students were engaging in unauthorized use
of campus pool); Leonardi v. Bradley Univ., 625 N.E.2d 431, 435-36 (I11. App.
Ct. 1993) (finding no duty to protect student against rape by fellow studenthttps://openscholarship.wustl.e u/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/10
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court refused to regard alcohol use by college students as so
morally wrong that it justified extra efforts for prevention.7 8 The
court stated that decreased supervision allowed students to "grow
into responsible adulthood." 79 Similarly, in Beach v. University
of Utah,8° the Utah Supreme Court refused to find a duty to
supervise and protect the student, reasoning that the university's
purpose was to educate, not to "baby sit," and that such
obligations would divert resources from education and create a
repressive environment.8 In Rabel v. Illinois Wesleyan Univer-
sity,82 the court rejected plaintiff's claim that the college, in
representing itself as a "strong disciplined" and "religious" in-
stitution, assumed a duty to supervise or prevent student activities
occurring in on-campus fraternity house), appeal denied, 155 Il. 2d 565 (1994);
Rabel v. Illinois Wesleyan Univ., 514 N.E.2d 552, 560-61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)
(finding no protective relationship to control intoxication of fraternity members
despite assertions in school bulletins concerning religious tenants and alcohol
policies of the school), cert. denied, 520 N.E.2d 392 (1988); Klobuchar v. Purdue
Univ., 553 N.E.2d 169, 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (finding no duty to protect
student from the criminal acts of her husband); Swanson v. Wabash College,
504 N.E.2d 327, 329-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); (finding no duty to supervise off-
campus recreational baseball games); Campbell v. Board of Trustees, 495 N.E.2d
227, 232-33 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (finding no duty to take measures to prevent
student drinking and driving); Fox v. Louisiana St. Univ., 576 So. 2d 978, 983
(La. 1991) (finding no duty to supervise rugby game and preceding alcohol
consumption); Eiseman v. New York, 511 N.E.2d 1128, 1136 (N.Y. 1987)
(holding that college had no duty to monitor ex-convict student enrolled under
state program to educate the disadvantaged); Alumni Association v. Sullivan,
572 A.2d 1209, 1213 (Pa. 1990) (finding no duty to take measures to prevent
intoxication of youth who committed arson while under the influence); Millard
v. Osborne, 611 A.2d 715, 720-21 (Pa. Super. Ct.) (finding no duty to monitor
drinking and driving), cert. denied, 615 A.2d 1312 (1992); Beach v. University
of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986) (holding that college had no duty to monitor
student's drinking on school sponsored biology field trip); Smith v. Day, 538
A.2d 157, 159-60 (Vt. 1987) (finding no duty to take measures to prevent
accidental shooting death). See also Michael R. Flaherty, Annotation, Tort
Liability of College or University for Injury Suffered by Student as a Result of
Own or Fellow Student's Intoxication, 62 A.L.R. 4th 81, 83 (1988) (noting that
"courts often reason that college administrators and faculties do not assume a
role in loco parentis, because college students are adults and not children of
tender years").
77. 176 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1981).
78. Id. at 817. In Baldwin, the plaintiff received serious injuries after the
car in which she was a passenger crashed. The car had been involved in a drag
race. The drivers of the vehicles involved in the accident had previously been
drinking in the school dormitories. Id. at 811-12.
79. Id. at 818.
80. 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986).
81. Id. at 418-19. In Beach, the plaintiff student had become intoxicated
during a biology field trip. While she was intoxicated, the plaintiff fell off of
a cliff and received serious injuries. Id. at 415.
82. 514 N.E.2d 552 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), cert. denied, 520 N.E.2d 392 (1988).
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inconsistent with such precepts.13 The court then held that such
obligations would cause administrative problems and divert re-
sources away from education.Y In University of Denver v. Whi-
tlock, 5 the Colorado Supreme Court recognized the serious risks
accompanying student alcohol use, but refused to find a special
relationship that could warrant a duty. 6 The court reasoned that
the school's efforts to ensure student safety were too minimal to
create a dependent relationship, and that custodial obligations
would directly conflict with student autonomy and independence.8
In Alumni Association v. Sullivan,8 the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania refused to hold a college to a duty to control the conduct
and alcohol consumption of a student who had set a fraternity
house ablaze.8 9 The court reasoned that this would force upon a
university an in loco parentis relationship that would be "inap-
propriate" in modern timesf 0
Courts have relied on Bradshaw when addressing the duty of
a college to protect students against crime. 91 For example, in
Tanja H. v. Regents of the University of California,9 a California
court held that the university had no duty to protect a student
against being gang raped by fellow students in an on-campus
dormitory.93 The court conceded that the incident may have been
foreseeable. 94 It recognized that students, due to their youth, were
often unaware of the dangers that alcohol posed and the risk of
violence. 95 Moreover, the court recognized that gang rape and
83. Id. at 558. Moreover, the court refused to find a special relationship
based upon the parties' landlord-tenant relationship. Id. at 562. The court
reasoned that Illinois law did not recognize the landlord-tenant relationship as
giving rise to a duty to control the intentional criminal acts of third parties. Id.
In Rabel, the plaintiff received injuries after she had been dropped by an
intoxicated student engaging in a fraternity prank. Id. at 554.
84. Id. at 558-61.
85. 744 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1987) (en banc).
86. Id. at 61. Whitlock received injuries while attempting to complete a flip
on a trampoline in front of his fraternity house. He landed on the back of his
head, breaking his neck. Id. at 56.
87. Id. at 62. The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that provisions
in the lease executed between the student and university gave rise to an obligation
to monitor the fraternity house. Id. at 61-62.
88. 572 A.2d 1209 (Pa. 1990).
89. Id. at 1209-10.
90. Id. at 1213.
91. See Hartman v. Bethany College, 778 F. Supp. 286, 291-95 (N.D. W.
Va. 1991); Tanja H. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 278 Cal. Rptr. 918, 920-
21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
92. 278 Cal. Rptr. 918 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
93. Id. at 919.
94. Id. at 921.
95. Id. at 920.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/10
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acquaintance rape on campus were widespread and "heinous." 96
Nevertheless, the court refused to find such risks unreasonable
because custodial responsibilities would place extensive burdens
on both students and colleges, burdens that would outweigh the
utility of preventing future attacks.Y In Hartman v. Bethany
College," a federal district court refused to find a duty to protect
the student from a sexual assault that had occurred off-campus. 99
The court found that it would be too burdensome to hold a
college responsible for monitoring the off-campus activities of
their students. '10
III. REVERSAL OF THE TREND: THE 1980s AND THE DUTY TO
PROTECT AGAiNsT ON-CAmpus ATTACKS
A. Duty based on the College's Position as Landholder or
Landlord
Faced with the problem of rape and sexual assault on campus,
some courts in the 1980s ignored the Bradshaw reasoning and
found a duty to protect based on premises liability principles. 01
In Relyea v. State,"1 the plaintiffs sued the university after two
female students were abducted from an unguarded parking lot
and murdered, and claimed that the institution had breached a
96. Id. at 921. In his concurrence, Justice Kline took issue with the majority's
suggestion that the concentration of young women on campus somehow con-
tributed to the problem of sexual assault. Justice Kline blamed the large number
of campus rapes to the victimization rate for women throughout society that is
highest at the age during which most women go to college. Thus, the college
could not be considered as having placed the student in any additional danger
and a duty to protect was not warranted. Id. at 923-26 (Kline, J., concurring).
97. Tanja H., 278 Cal. Rptr. at 921-22.
98. 778 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. W. Va. 1991).
99. The plaintiff was assaulted by two non-students whom she met while
socializing at an off-campus establishment named "Bubba's Bison Inn." Id. at
289.
100. Id. at 292-93.
101. See Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 685 P.2d 1193,
1201-02 (Cal. 1984) (finding duty to exercise care to ensure a campus safe from
criminal attack); Relyea v. State, 385 So. 2d 1378, 1383-84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (stating in dictum that college could have an obligation to take security
measures if criminal acts had been foreseeable); Miller v. State, 467 N.E.2d
493, 497 (N.Y. 1984) (finding duty to provide adequate security in dormitories);
Brown v. North Carolina Wesleyan College, 309 S.E.2d 701, 703 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1983) (recognizing in dictum possible existence of a duty). See generally
Sharlene A. McEvoy, Campus Insecurity: Duty, Foreseeability, and Third Party
Liability, 21 J.L. & EDUC. 137 (1993) (discussing extent of university liability
for campus crime).
102. 385 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
1994] 205
Washington University Open Scholarship
206 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 46:189
duty to provide adequate security.03 The court reasoned that a
duty to protect could arise from the parties' relationship as
landowner and invitee."°4 However, for a duty to attach, the
criminal acts had to have been reasonably foreseeable. According
to the court, this finding hinged on actual or constructive knowl-
edge of prior, similar crimes. 0s
In Miller v. State,' 6 the New York Court of Appeals recognized
that the university's position as landlord to dormitory residents
could support a duty to protect students against foreseeable
criminal attacks. °0 However, as many states have not recognized
the landlord's general duty to protect against foreseeable crime,
this argument has met limited acceptance. °8
When courts base liability on the landholder/invitee or land-
lord/tenant relationships the main issue is the foreseeability of
the crime.1" 9 As in Relyea, courts often hinge foreseeability on
the finding of prior, similar crimes." 0 Congress aided plaintiffs
103. Id. at 1380. The building in which the university held the class was
located "in a remote, outlying area on the northeast comer of the campus,
approximately three quarters of a mile from the main complex of buildings."
Id.
104. Id. at 1383.
105. Id. The court found that the college had no such knowledge, and found
no duty. The only crimes the university had previously encountered were minor
transgressions. Id.
106. 467 N.E.2d 493, 497 (N.Y. 1984).
107. Id. at 497. See also Nero v. Kansas State Univ., 861 P.2d 768 (Kan.
1993) (recognizing that landlord/tenant relationship arising from dormitory
housing could constitute special relationship).
108. See McEvoy, supra note 101, at 145-46 (noting that "state courts are
split on the extent to which the university as a landlord has a duty to protect
students who live in its residence halls").
The duty of a landlord to protect tenants against criminal attack or theft is
a recent judicial invention. See KEETON, supra note 17, at 442. In Kline v.
Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970), a court
first imposed a duty on the landlord of an urban apartment building to protect
the tenants of the building from foreseeable criminal assaults. Id. at 485. Not
all states accept this duty, but it is gaining increased recognition. KIETON, supra
note 17, at 442; see also Irma W. Merrill, Note, Landlord Liability for Crimes
Committed by Third Parties Against Tenants on the Premises, 38 VAN'D. L.
Rnv. 431, 432 (1985).
109. See McEvoy, supra note 101, at 139-43.
110. See, e.g., Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 685 P.2d
1193, 1201-02 (Cal. 1984) (finding duty to exercise care to ensure a safe campus
based on knowledge of prior criminal attacks); Savannah College of Art &
Design v. Roe, 409 S.E.2d 848, 850 (Ga. 1991) (recognizing possible existence
of duty but finding no evidence of prior similar attacks). See generally Michael
C. Griffaton, Note, Forewarned is Forearmed: The Crime Awareness and
Campus Security Act of 1990 and the Future of Institutional Liability for
Student Victimization, 43 CAs W. Rus. L. REv. 525, 581 (1993) (noting that
foreseeability typically hinges on finding of prior similar acts).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/10
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by passing the Student Right-to-Know and Campus Security Act
in 1990."' The Act requires the college, as a condition to receiving
federal funds, to release extensive information about the amounts
and types of crimes that have occurred on its campus. 112 Com-
mentators have suggested that this Act will help plaintiffs show
the foreseeability of the particular crimes of which they were
victims." 3
B. Duty to Protect Based on Policy Factors
In Mullins v. Pine Manor College,114 the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court justified finding a duty to protect largely on policy
factors that conflicted with the Bradshaw reasoning."' The plain-
tiff, a resident student at an all women's college near Boston,
111. Pub. L. No. 101-542, 104 Stat. 2381 (1990) (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. § 1092(f) (Supp. IV 1992)).
112. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (Supp. IV 1992). The Act requires colleges to certify
that they have established a security policy on campus. Specifically, the Act
requires the college to disclose:
(A) A statement of current campus policies regarding procedures
and facilities for students and others to report criminal actions or
other emergencies occurring on campus and policies concerning the
institution's response to such reports.
(B) A statement of current policies concerning security and access
to campus facilities, including campus residences, and security con-
siderations used in the maintenance of campus facilities.
(F) Statistics concerning the occurrence on campus, during the most
recent calendar year, and during the 2 preceding calendar years for
which data are available, of the following criminal offenses reported
to campus security authorities or local police agencies -
(i) murder;




(vi) motor vehicle theft.
(H) Statistics concerning the number of arrests for the following
crimes occurring on campus:
(i) liquor law violations;
(ii) drug abuse violations; and
(iii) weapons possessions.
Id.
113. See McEvoy, supra note 101, at 151. But see Griffaton, supra note 110,
at 579 (noting that the Campus Crime Act will create questions regarding the
value of statistics in determining foreseeability).
114. 449 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1983).
115. See supra notes 58-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Bradshaw policy reasoning.
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was raped by an intruder who broke into her dormitory. 16 The
court first determined that a duty to protect the student arose
from the expectations of society, parents, and students.117 Ac-
cording to the court, the community still expected universities to
take security measures for their students, despite the demise of
in loco parentis."8 The court pointed to factors that made it
difficult for students to protect themselves." 9 The court empha-
sized that students need protection because of their inexperience. 120
Moreover, only the school could provide this safety.'2'
The court also found that the college voluntarily assumed a
duty to protect its students.'2 The court found that physical
manifestations of security, such as the fence that ran around the
campus, implied that the college promised a secure campus.'2
116. Mullins, 449 N.E.2d at 334. Mullins locked her door to her dormitory
room when she went to sleep. The intruder entered her room, awakened her,
and took her out of the building into a courtyard outside the dormitory. The
intruder brought Mullins out of the courtyard through a gate, which was
chained, but not tightly secured. The intruder then led Mullins into a campus
building which remained unlocked, whereupon he raped her. The entire incident
lasted 60 to 90 minutes, and the plaintiff and intruder were outside campus
buildings for at least 20 minutes. At no time did security intervene to assist the
plaintiff. Id.
117. Id. at 335 (citing Schofield v. Merril, 435 N.E.2d 339 (Mass. 1982)
(noting that duty finds its "source in existing social values and customs")).
118. Id. at 335-36. The court determined that the demise of in loco parentis
did not mean it had no responsibility to provide a safe campus, noting "[t]he
fact that a college need not police the morals of its resident students, however,
does not entitle it to abandon any effort to ensure their physical safety." Id.
119. Id. at 335. The court noted that students could not establish a system
for the announcement of authorized visitors in the dormitories, and pointed to
university regulations that actually made it a violation to take individual security
measures such as installing a second lock on a dormitory room door. The court
also noted that the concentration of young women made this particular campus
a target. Id.
120. Id. The court cited the testimony of one expert witness who referred to
students as "young people who are legally adults and have not understood
really what adulthood perhaps means." Id. at 335 n.7.
121. Mullins, 449 N.E.2d at 335. The court stated "[tihus, the college must
take the responsibility on itself if anything is to be done at all." Id.
122. Id. at 336. The court relied on § 323 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, which states:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the
protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to
the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to
exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm
is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
123. Mullins, 449 N.E.2d at 336. ("[P]rospective students ... are certain to
note the presence of a fence around the campus, the existence of security guards,
and any other visible steps taken to ensure the safety of students.").https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/10
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Parents and potential students relied upon these representations
in choosing to go to the college, and later relied upon them for
their security.124 The court found that adequate security consti-
tuted an "indispensable" service that colleges provided to their
students.125 Finally, the court held that the crimes that had
occurred were foreseeable to the college. 126 The court did not
require findings of prior similar criminal acts. 127
IV. THE NnmTiES: PROTECTION THROUGH SUPERVISION OF
STUDENTS
The decisions during the 1980s holding colleges responsible for
providing security prompted commentators to debate whether in
loco parentis was making a return in the area of tort liability.' 28
124. Id. at 336-37.
125. Id. at 336. The court stated, "[W]hen students are considering enrolling
in a particular college, they are likely to weigh a number of factors. But a
threshold matter is whether the college has undertaken to provide an adequate
level of security." Id.
126. Id. at 337. The court noted testimony of school officials who had warned
students about the dangers of living in close proximity of an urban area. Id.
127. Mullins, 449 N.E.2d at 337 & n.12.
128. In their 1987 article, James Szablewicz and Annette Gibbs noted that
"a new in loco parentis relationship is developing. Students are demanding it."
Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note 10, at 454. The authors reasoned that new
attitudes in the 1980s created this trend. "Students began to expect their colleges
to get them jobs, provide them with tuition assistance and establish their
careers." Id. at 453. The authors suggested that the increase in lawsuits against
universities is a manifestation of students' desires to receive university protection.
Id. at 457. The authors pointed to four cases as evidence of their thesis: Peterson
v. San Francisco College, 685 P.2d 1193, 1198 (Cal. 1984) (finding duty based
on college's obligation to provide safe premises); Whitlock v. University of
Denver, 712 P.2d 1072, 1075-76 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (finding duty to provide
safe premises where student received injuries while jumping on trampoline),
rev'd, 744 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1987) (en banc); Relyea v. State, 385 So. 2d 1378,
1382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (noting possibility that college could have a
duty to provide security, but declining to impose such duty absent a history of
violent attacks in area); Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 449 N.E.2d 331, 336
(Mass. 1983) (holding college to a duty to provide security against foreseeable
criminal actions). Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note 10, at 458-61. Szablewicz and
Gibbs, after discussing the intermediate court's decision in Whitlock, acknowl-
edged that the Supreme Court of Colorado had recently reversed the decision.
Id. at 460. Nevertheless, they asserted that the case evidences a return to the in
loco parentis doctrine because a jury and appellate court imposed liability upon
a university. Id. at 460-61.
The Szablewicz and Gibbs theory drew harsh criticism from Theodore Sta-
matakos. Stamatakos, in his 1991 article, vigorously rejected Szablewicz and
Gibbs' argument that the in loco parentis doctrine is making a comeback.
Stamatakos first rejected the contention that in loco parentis once provided a
basis for tort liability. Stamatakos, supra note 9, at 482-84. Stamatakos asserted
that recent cases to which Szablewicz and Gibbs cite represent ordinary appli-
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Decisions during the 1990s have expanded the colleges' duties
beyond merely providing adequate security. In many cases, these
decisions have held the college to a duty to protect that requires
the college to exercise a uniquely parental role. Courts are holding
colleges responsible for monitoring the activities of students, and
to educate and warn students about dangers on campus. Basically,
courts are holding colleges responsible for keeping their students
out of trouble. A general duty to supervise is emerging. This
section highlights different types of injuries and risks in which
the duty to supervise is emerging.
A. Supervision of Dangerous Hazing Activities
In Furek v. University of Delaware,129 the Delaware Supreme
Court found that the university owed a duty to control the hazing
activities of an on-campus fraternity. 30 Hazing was against uni-
versity rules, and the university had on several occasions expressed
its concern that students abide by this rule.' The plaintiff, Jeffrey
Furek, suffered second-degree bums after a fellow student poured
a lye-based oven cleaner over Furek's body during a hazing event
that occurred in an on-campus fraternity house.3 2 Furek sued,
claiming that the university had a responsibility to control the
hazing. 33
cations of tort principles, and do not evince a repudiation of the Bradshaw
policy rationale. Id. at 484-87. Stamatakos blamed the rise in tort claims against
the university as a general manifestation of the litigation explosion of the 1980s,
or as "a recognition by attorneys that college coffers are among the deepest of
the much sought-after 'deep pockets."' Id.
129. 594 A.2d 506 (Del. 1991).
130. Id. at 522-23.
131. Id. at 510-11. The court noted a university-published guide to student
life. Id. at 510 n.2. It contained the following statement: "Respect for Dignity
and Rights of Other Students is a basic tenet of the academic community.
Hazing, the subjection of an individual to any form of humiliating treatment
and the violation of the rights of other students, have no place in the University
community." Id. The guide also advised students that "[t]he University reserves
the right to deny registration to student. . . activities which expose their members
to high bodily risk for which the University might be considered liable." Id.
The court also pointed to statements that the Dean of Students had published
that both recited concern about fraternity hazing and offered help to the
fraternity in formulating non-hazing activities. Id. at 510. The court noted
continued contact between the Dean of Students and the fraternities regarding
alleged hazing incidents. Id. Also, the school sent fraternities a copy of a speech
given on campus by the mother of a hazing victim from another institution.
Id.
132. Id. at 510. Furek had been a pledge for Sigma Phi Epsilon Fraternity.
Id. at 509. During the event, Joseph Donchez poured the oven cleaner over the
neck, back, and shoulders of Furek, causing second-degree burns and permanent
scarring. Id. at 510. Furek was blindfolded when this occurred. Id.
133. Id. at 511.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/10
COLLEGE'S EMERGING DUTY
The Delaware Supreme Court confronted the Bradshaw line of
cases and questioned why the student-college relationship should
not be a special relationship."' The court described several factors
showing that the university controlled and guided student life.'35
The university provided security, food, housing, and extracurric-
ular activities.'3 The court questioned the premises underlying
the Bradshaw line of cases.3 7 First, the court questioned whether
the lack of supervision furthered the maturation process, noting
that Bradshaw provided no empirical support for that proposi-
tion.' The court also questioned whether supervising dangerous
activities conflicted with the demise of in loco parentis, noting
that students who revolted in the 1960s protested political and
intellectual coercion rather than basic protective measures. 139 Fur-
ther, the court noted that the law did not recognize most students
as adults for the purpose of alcohol consumption because most
students are not legally old enough to consume alcohol.140 Nev-
ertheless, the court bowed to the "apparent weight" of precedent 4'
and refused to hold that the student-college relationship was a
special relationship.142
134. Furek, 594 A.2d at 517-19.
135. Id. at 516.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 516-18.
138. Id. at 518 (criticizing Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 419
(Utah 1986)).
139. Furek, 594 A.2d at 518 n.11. In criticizing cases that have relied on the
Bradshaw reasoning, the court noted that students during the 1960s did not
protest against supervision and protection from dangerous activities like excessive
drinking and the misuse of a trampoline. Id. at 518 n.11 (citing University of
Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 55, 56 (Colo. 1987) (en banc)).
140. Id. at 518. The court found significant the fact that since the Bradshaw
decision in 1979, there had been a national trend in raising the legal drinking
age from 18 to 21. Id. at 518 n.12.
141. Id. at 519-20. The court also discussed Mullins and other decisions
suggesting that the generic college-student relationship could give rise to a duty
to supervise. See id. at 518-19 (citing Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 449
N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1983); Rubtchinsky v. State Univ., 260 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Ct.
Cl. 1965); Zavala v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 178 Cal. Rptr. 185 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981)).
142. Id. at 519-20. The court also rejected the argument accepted by the trial
court that the university had a duty to supervise students because they were
persons having dangerous propensities. Id. at 519. The plaintiff based this
argument on § 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states:
Duty of Those in Charge of Person Having Dangerous Propensities.
One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should
know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled
is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third
person to prevent him from doing such harm.
RwSATEmENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 319 (1965).
The court suggested that this relationship contemplates relationships of much
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Although the court did not find a special relationship, the
court did find that the university had voluntarily assumed a duty
to monitor the fraternity for hazing violations. 143 This duty arose
implicitly through the school's repeated written and verbal com-
munications concerning its efforts to eradicate hazing. 44 The court
concluded that students could have relied on the university to
enforce its own articulated ideals. 41
The court also found that the student's position as a business
invitee' 4 gave rise to a special relationship that could support a
duty. 47 Although the court acknowledged that the university did
not own the fraternity house, a special relationship existed because
the university owned the land on which the house stood.'4 The
closer control than the university-student relationship. Furek, 594 A.2d at 519.
The court cited the relationship between a physician at a mental hospital and a
patient as an example. The court reasoned that the actions and qualities of
fraternity brothers do not conform to this custodial standard. Id.
143. Id. at 520.
144. Id. See supra note 123 for a discussion of the university's anti-hazing
communications.
145. Id. at 520 (citing Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 449 N.E.2d 331, 336
(Mass. 1983)).
146. The court cited §§ 343 and 344 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Section 343, Dangerous Conditions known to or Discoverable by Possessor,
states:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused
to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he (a)
knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the
condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk
of harm to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not
discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves
against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them
against the danger.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965). For the text of § 344, see supra
note 52.
147. Furek, 594 A.2d at 520-22. But see University of Denver v. Whitlock,
744 P.2d 54, 61-62 (Colo. 1987) (en banc) (rejecting contention that lease
provision allowing university to evict upon the discovery of "immoral or
unlawful conduct" imposed a duty to direct and control activities within the
property); Rabel v. Illinois Wesleyan Univ., 514 N.E.2d 552, 561-62 (I11. App.
Ct. 1987) (rejecting duty based on landlord-tenant relationship), cert. denied,
520 N.E.2d 392 (1988).
148. Furek, 594 A.2d at 522. But see Leonardi v. Bradley Univ., 625 N.E.2d
431, 435-36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), appeal denied, 155 IlL. 2d 565 (1994). In
Leonardi, an Illinois appellate court refused to find that a landholder-invitee
relationship existed between the university and a student who had been raped
in a fraternity house located on-campus. Id. The court reasoned that there were
"no facts alleged ... which show that plaintiff's location at the time of the
assault was connected with any activity conducted or sponsored by Bradley or
that Bradley received any benefit from her presence at the fraternity house."
Id. at 435. Additionally, the court relied on the fact that the fraternity house
itself was not owned by the university. Id. at 436. The court did not addresshttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/10
COLLEGE'S EMERGING DUTY
court found that the university had a duty arising from this
relationship because it could have foreseen the hazing dangers
posed by the students, and because the students initiating the
hazing were within the university's control. 49 In finding foresee-
ability, the court noted past hazing incidents at the fraternity
house where the incident took place, and the university's general
commitment to combat hazing. 50 In finding that the university
had control, the court noted, among other factors, that the
university police had authority to police the fraternity house
because members of the fraternity were still subject to university
rules.151
B. Protecting Students from Physical Hazards on Campus
In Pitre v. Louisiana Tech University, 52 a Louisiana Appellate
Court held the university to a duty to protect the student from
his own reckless behavior. 5 3 The plaintiff, Earl Pitre, suffered
injuries while sledding down a hill on campus grounds.5 4 Pitre
hit a concrete encased light pole in the parking lot located at the
bottom of the hill, rendering him a paraplegic.' The appellate
court found that the university owed the plaintiff a duty to
correct or warn of unreasonably dangerous conditions on the
campus.? 6 The court found that a special relationship arose from
the plaintiff's status as a resident student.5 7 The court reasoned
that the university operated as a custodian of resident students
because of its regulation of their lives.' This regulation created
an ensuing obligation to take steps to protect students from
foreseeable harm.15 9 The court also held that a special relationship
the Furek decision.
One Justice dissented. Id. at 436-39 (Breslin, J., dissenting). For a discussion
of this dissent, see infra notes 195-203 and accompanying text.
149. Furek, 594 A.2d at 521-22.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 522.
152. 596 So. 2d 1324, 1332 (La. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 604 So. 2d
998 (1992).
153. Id. at 1334.
154. Id. at 1332. Plaintiff had been using a trash container lid as a "sled."
Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1332-33.
157. Pitre, 596 So. 2d at 1332-33.
158. Id. at 1332. The court stated that "[u]niversities guide many aspects of
student life by undertaking to provide food, housing, security and a wide range
of extracurricular activities." Id.
159. Id. Judge Brown wrote the majority opinion. This opinion was written
on rehearing, and reversed a prior decision the court made. In the original
opinion, reprinted before the final opinion, Judge Brown dissented. See id. at
2131994]
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arose from the plaintiff's invitee status.w After establishing the
existence of a special relationship, the court found that the
university had created an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of
injury by failing to take steps to prevent sledding at the spot
where the injury occurred.' 6' The court reasoned that the univer-
sity had been aware of the dangers at the injury site, but had
created an illusion of safety by allowing the sledding to occur. 62
The dissent in Pitre argued that the majority's opinion would
make the college responsible for ensuring the safety of their
students.63 This standard would contradict the generally accepted
rule that colleges no longer stand in an in loco parentis relation-
ship to their students.' 64
C. Providing Safety Measures for Student Athletes
In Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 65 the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals, the same court that decided Bradshaw almost fifteen
years earlier, held the college to a duty to protect a student from
harm while engaging in a school-sponsored athletic activity for
which the student had been recruited.' 66 Richard Kleinknecht, a
1330-31 (original opinion) (Brown, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Brown
more emphatically asserted that the student-college relationship created a duty
to supervise and protect the student:
The concentration of young people on a college campus creates
conditions that can cause injuries. Therefore, colleges have enacted
many rules and regulations to protect its [sic] students. A college
has a special relationship with its resident students which obligates
it to take reasonable and necessary steps to protect their safety from
foreseeable harm.... College administrators know that a 20 year
old may be an adult legally, but normally lacks the experience to
understand adulthood.
Id. at 1330-31 (Brown, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 1332.
161. Id. at 1333.
162. The court reasoned that the school, through statements in its housing
manual, had implied that sledding was safe at the area where the accident
occurred. Pitre, 596 So. 2d at 1333. The court noted that the university had
listed several spots in its housing manual where sledding was prohibited. Id.
The spot where the accident had occurred was not listed. The manual otherwise
encouraged sledding. Id. at 1332. However, the court noted that the campus
police considered the area dangerous, and had made routine efforts to stop
sledding at that spot. Id. at 1333-34.
163. Id. at 1333-34 (Lindsay, J., dissenting).
164. Id. The dissent also argued that the danger posed by the light posts was
minimal, thus posing no unreasonable risk of harm. Id. at 1334. The Louisiana
Supreme Court refused to review the decision. Pitre v. Louisiana Tech Univ.,
604 So. 2d 998 (La. 1992) (three of seven justices wishing to grant certiorari).
165. 989 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1993).
166. Id. at 1369.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/10
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seemingly healthy athlete, died of cardiac arrest on campus during
a practice session for the school's lacrosse team. 67
Kleinknecht's parents sued the university, claiming that it failed
to implement reasonable preventative measures to ensure prompt
medical attention if one of its athletes suffered cardiac arrest.'6
The trial court granted the university's motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that the university had no duty to
anticipate and guard against the chance that a young, healthy
athlete would suffer cardiac arrest. 69 The Third Circuit reversed
the summary judgment.'" In finding a special relationship, the
court reasoned that the school assumed such a responsibility
because the student participated in a school sponsored and su-
pervised activity. 7' The court differentiated the case from Alumni
Association v. Sullivan,7 2 decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, 17 and Bradshaw, which had been decided under Pennsyl-
167. Id. at 1365. According to the court, the plaintiff's brief described
Kleinknecht as "a healthy, physically active and vigorous young man" with no
unusual medical history until his death." Id. While the college employed two
full-time trainers who were skilled in C.P.R., neither was present during the
practice at which Kleinknecht died and the lacrosse coaches had no such training.
Id. at 1363.
168. Id. at 1365.
169. Id. at 1332 (citing Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 786 F. Supp. 449,
454 (M.D. Pa. 1992)).
170. Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1372.
171. Id. at 1367. The court cited as supporting authority cases involving high
school athletic programs. Id. The court cited to one case involving athletics at
the college level. Fox v. Board of Supervisors, 576 So. 2d 978 (La. 1991). In
Fox, however, the court held that the university had been under no duty to
protect the student athlete in that case. Id. at 983. In Fox, Louisiana State
University (L.S.U.) hosted a visiting rugby team. Before the scheduled game,
the L.S.U. team hosted a cocktail party to which the visiting team was invited.
Id. at 980. Tim Fox, a player on the visiting team, became intoxicated at the
event. During the subsequent game, Fox missed a tackle and fell on his head,
rendering him a quadriplegic. Fox sued the university on the theory that it had
a responsibility to supervise the game and monitor the drinking before the
competition. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of L.S.U.
Id. The appellate court affirmed. Fox v. Board of Supervisors, 559 So. 2d 850
(La. Ct. App. 1990).
The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed. Fox, 576 So. 2d at 983. The court
acknowledged that L.S.U. had a duty to ensure that its premises were free from
defects. However, the court held that no special relationship existed between
the injured student and L.S.U. The court reasoned that the injured party, a
student at another school, had no connection with L.S.U. Id. at 982. Next,
citing the demise of in loco parentis and the burden of supervisory responsibil-
ities, the court refused to hold L.S.U. to a duty to monitor the actions of its
rugby players. Id. at 982-83.
172. 572 A.2d 1209 (Pa. 1990). See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Sullivan.
173. The court, exercising diversity jurisdiction, applied Pennsylvania law.
Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1365.
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vania law. 174 The court reasoned that there was no special rela-
tionship in Sullivan or Bradshaw because the students had acted
in their private capacities. 175 Kleinknecht, however, had been
injured while acting in the school's interest.' 76 The school's re-
cruitment of Kleinknecht indicated that the school intended to
benefit from his participation in the program.'" The court stated
in dictum that the result probably would have been different if
the student had been participating in intramural sports.'
The court went on to find that the college, in failing to provide
the safety equipment, had created a foreseeable and unreasonable
risk of injury. 179 The court found that it was foreseeable that
student athletes could encounter life-threatening health problems
during athletic activity. 180 The court noted the testimony of the
athletic trainers at the school who were aware of other instances
in which athletes died during competition.' Examining whether
the foreseeable risk was unreasonable, the court determined that
the utility of taking potentially life-saving protective action out-
weighed the burden of imposing such responsibilities on the
college. 182
D. Supervision of Students to Prevent Rape
In Nero v. Kansas State University,' the Kansas Supreme
Court, facing a motion for summary judgment from the defen-
dant university, refused to find as a matter of law that the
university did not owe a duty to supervise the conduct of a
potentially dangerous resident student.14 In Nero, the plaintiff
sued the university after she was sexually assaulted in her residence
hall by a fellow student, Davenport. 85 Thirty-five days earlier, a
174. Id. at 1367-68. For a discussion of Bradshaw, see supra notes 58-75.
175. Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1367-68.
176. Id. at 1368.
177. Id. The court suggested that the school recruited Kleinknecht "thinking
that his skill at lacrosse would bring favorable attention and so aid the College
in attracting other students." Id.
178. Id. at 1368.
179. Id. at 1371.
180. Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1370.
181. Id.
182. Id. One judge dissented, asserting the same reasons as the district court
had expressed. Id. at 1375 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg
College, 786 F. Supp. 449 (M.D. Pa. 1992)).
183. 861 P.2d 768 (Kan. 1993).
184. Id. at 779-80.
185. Id. at 771-72. Davenport joined Nero while she had been watching
television and doing laundry in the basement recreation room of her dormitory.
According to the court, Davenport sexually assaulted Nero while the two watched
television. Id. at 772.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/10
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different student had accused Davenport of raping her.1s6 Dav-
enport had been indicted for the first incident one month before
the second.187 The university administration moved Davenport to
the plaintiff's dormitory in an effort to separate him from the
first victim.ss
The defendant's motion for summary judgment claimed that
the university owed no duty to monitor Davenport. 8 9 In rejecting
this argument, the Kansas Supreme Court agreed that in loco
parentis was inappropriate for the modern campus."93 Neverthe-
less, the court found that the university could have a duty to
exercise care to protect the plaintiff from Davenport via the
parties' landlord/tenant 9' and landholder/invitee relationships.' 92
Pointing to the university's knowledge of the alleged rape and
its response in moving Davenport, the court held that the fore-
seeability of the attack could not be decided as a matter of law
on summary judgment."93 Thus, the judge's ultimate finding as
to whether the university's non-action constituted an unreasonable
and foreseeable risk to the plaintiff depended on subsequent
findings of fact."94
186. Id. at 771.
187. Id.
188. Nero, 861 P.2d at 771.
189. Id. at 768.
190. Id. The court also refused to posit a duty based on the plaintiff's
argument that the university was in charge of a person with "dangerous
propensities," as recognized in § 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The
court reasoned that the university had not taken charge of Davenport when it
changed his dormitory assignments. Nero, 861 P.2d at 778-79.
191. Id. at 779. The court found that the university, in providing campus
housing, existed as a landlord in competition with other private landlords. Id.
See generally supra note 108 for a discussion of the common-law duty of the
landlord to protect tenants against foreseeable crime.
192. Nero, 861 P.2d at 780. The court cited to § 344 of the Restatement(Second) of Torts. See supra note 52 for the text of § 344.
193. Nero, 861 P.2d at 780.
194. Id. Two justices concurred in some parts of the opinion, but dissented
regarding the finding of foreseeability. Justice Six concurred in the court's
holding that the college did not act in loco parentis. Id. at 783 (Six, J.,
concurring and dissenting). However, Justice Six dissented from the court's
holding that the attack was foreseeable. The Justice reasoned that the student
had been charged with rape but had not been convicted. According to Justice
Six, because the criminal justice system regards those charged with a crime as
being innocent until proven guilty, it would be improper to require the university
to single out such an individual for special supervision. Id.
Justice McFarland joined the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice
Six. Id. at 788 (McFarland, J., concurring and dissenting). In a separate opinion,
Justice McFarland argued that the majority sought to place an unreasonable
burden on the university. The university would be faced with a student presumed
innocent by the law, who in most cases would be under instructions from his
19941
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Similarly, in Leonardi v. Bradley University, 95 the dissent
vigorously argued that the university should have been held to a
duty to protect a student from a rape by a fellow student that
occurred in an on-campus fraternity house.'1 The majority re-
fused to find a special relationship, claiming that no landholder/
invitee relationship existed.1' 7
The dissent concluded, however, that the student was a business
invitee, reasoning that (1) the student had been expressly invited
onto the university premises; (2) that the university had permitted
the actions of the fraternity to take place; and (3) that the
university had benefited from the fraternity's presence. 98 Next,
the dissent emphasized the foreseeability of campus rape, pointing
to statistical studies both at colleges in general and at Bradley
University in particular. 199 The dissent next reasoned that the
likelihood of injury in rape cases is extremely high,200 and pointed
to medical studies indicating the physical and psychological effects
of rape. 201 The dissent reasoned that the burden of placing
protective responsibilities on the university was low.202 The dissent
reasoned that colleges already disseminate large quantities of
information to students, and that instituting programs to warn
students of such potential dangers is an extremely low burden. 23
V. Tim EmERGING DUTY TO SUPERViSE
A. Analysis
During the 1990s, courts have held colleges to greater respon-
sibilities to oversee the lives and activities of their students. This
threat of tort liability is moving the student-college relationship
back towards in loco parentis.2°4
lawyer to keep silent. Thus, while the university cannot discuss the events with
the alleged perpetrator, it would be required to treat him like a pariah, and
alienate him from female students. Id. at 789.
195. 625 N.E.2d 431 (I11. App. Ct. 1993).
196. Id. at 436-39 (Breslin, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 435-36. For a discussion of the majority's reasoning, see supra
note 148.
198. Id. at 437 (Breslin, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 438 (Breslin, J., dissenting).




204. See Matthews, supra note 1, at 38, 42, 47 (remarking in the context of
crime prevention that "[a]ll this resembles a revival of the in loco parentis
doctrine," and a "newfound paternalism").https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/10
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Because the duty question revolves around policy, it appears
that courts are reexamining the policy foundations upon which
Bradshaw was based.m First, courts seem to be recognizing an
in loco parentis role for colleges, if not an in loco parentis special
relationship in tort theory.3 While no cases, except perhaps for
Pitre,2 assert a protective relationship based solely on the generic
student-college relationship, decisions expanding the college's duty
have relied on elements unique to the college context to find a
duty. Mullins, Pitre, and Furek expressly point to aspects of the
college setting that cause students to depend on the university for
protection." Dependence characterizes the historic in loco par-
entis relationship.2 It is questionable whether courts would find
a similar duty if the parties were not a student and a college.
For example, in Nero, the court probably would not have held
a non-university landlord or landholder to a duty to supervise
the behavior of a tenant in its building solely because the tenant
had been indicted for a crime.210 Similarly, in Furek, it seems
unlikely that the court could find any fact situation under which
it would hold a non-university landlord or landholder to a duty
to monitor fraternity hazing on its property.21' Moreover, the
court's reliance on contract principles in Furek is analytically
weak, and provides a typical example of the flaws of contract
analysis.212 The court in Furek provided no evidence that students
actually relied on and expected the college to enforce its homilies
against hazing by patrolling fraternity houses. 213 Rather, it appears
that the court's assumptions were based on its perception that
the college fulfills a custodial role.
It appears that modem courts may be re-examining the benefit
of prohibiting universities from intruding on students' lives. 214
205. See supra notes 23-25.
206. For a discussion of the in loco parentis relationship, see supra part II.B.
207. See Pitre, 596 So. 2d at 1332-33. See generally supra notes 152-64 for
a discussion of Pitre.
208. See, e.g., Leonardi, 625 N.E.2d at 438 (noting high probability that
women will be victimized by rape or sexual assault while in college).
209. See supra part II.B. for a discussion of in loco parentis.
210. See Nero v. Kansas State Univ., 861 P.2d 768, 780 (Kan. 1993).
211. See Furek v. University of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 520-21 (Del. 1991).
212. See id. at 520. See generally Dodd, supra note 48 (discussing analytical
problems of contractual analysis as a tool for examining the student-college
relationship).
213. See Furek, 594 A.2d at 520.
214. According to § 293 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the factors
considered for determining the magnitude of the risk when finding whether the
actor was negligent include: the social value of the interest in danger; the extent
of the possibility that the actor's non-action will harm another; the extent of
the harm likely to occur; and the number of persons likely to be harmed.
RmTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 293 (1965).
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Society has become more concerned with hazing and alcohol use
in recent years. Legislatures have imposed anti-hazing laws and
courts have imposed greater liability on fraternal organizations
and their individual members for hazing injuries. 2I Moreover,
society has taken a stricter view of alcohol use in recent decades,
as evidenced by increased drinking ages and stricter punishments
for drinking and driving. Moreover, courts and legislatures have
been more willing to impose dram shop and social host liability.
216
Thus, society has taken a different view of alcohol consumption
than did the Bradshaw court, which dismissed beer drinking as
a harmless rite of passage for students and an accepted practice
for adults. 217
Society has also become much more concerned with campus
crime.218 Perhaps the most telling manifestation of this is the
Student Right-to-Know and Campus Security Act.2 9 In passing
the Act, Congress found that crime on campus was a serious and
increasing problem. 2  Additionally, Congress found that "there
is a clear need ... to encourage the development on all campuses
215. See generally Susan J. Curry, Note, Hazing and the "Rush" Toward
Reform: Responses from Universities, Fraternities, State Legislatures, and the
Courts, 16 J.C. & U.L. 93 (1989) (documenting cases that have increased
fraternity liability and legislative attempts to reduce hazing); Byron L. LeFlore,
Jr., Note, Alcohol and Hazing Risks in College Fraternities: Re-evaluating
Vicarious and Custodial Liability of National Fraternities, 7 REv. Lmo. 191
(1988) (documenting the expanding theories that plaintiffs use to hold national
fraternities liable for hazing).
216. Dram shop statutes, which are relatively common, impose civil and
criminal liability for the harm caused by the actor's negligent conduct on
businesses that served alcohol to the intoxicated actor. Social host liability, to
which the courts have reacted lukewarmly, imposes liability for negligence on
social hosts who serve alcohol to intoxicated guests. See, e.g., McGuiggan v.
New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 496 N.E.2d 141, 145-46 (Mass. 1986) (favoring
social host liability in certain fact situations). For general discussions of such
concepts, see Angelina Marie Massari, Am I my Brother's Keeper? Social Host
Liability Under Dramshop Acts and Common Law Negligence, 32 WASH. U.
J. U.B. & Cotrrnmp. L. 149 (1987); Kevin N. Koloff, Note, The Torts of the
Intoxicated: Who Should be Liable? 15 COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 33 (1979).
217. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., Matthews, supra note 1, at 38 ("Campus murders or threat
of murder invariably make it to page 1 of local and national newspapers .... ).
Matthews quoted one university administrator: "Our only campus crime used
to be plagiarism, but so much odd stuff appeared in the 80's - rapes, robberies,
even the kid who used his prosthetic arm to beat up a dormnimate - that I
decided we needed to know: Is it us or is it society?" Id. at 38-39.
219. Pub. L. No. 101-542, 104 Stat. 2381 (1990) (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. § 1092(f) (Supp. IV 1992)). For the text of the reporting requirements,
see supra note 112.
220. Student Right-To-Know and Campus Security Act, Pub. L. No. 101-
542, § 202, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2381, 2384-85.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/10
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of security policies and procedures... ."22 Prior to the Act,
several states had enacted similar statutes. 2
Additionally, the problem of sexual assault on campus has
increased, and has accordingly experienced enormous coverage in
the media. There has also been a recent backlash against
student-faculty romantic encounters. Several colleges have banned
such conduct, indicating the view that the college must protect
its students, a hallmark of in loco parentis.
Moreover, it appears that society may no longer view intrusion
into the student life as a serious harm. Bradshaw relied on
findings that custodial policies were inconsistent with the student-
college relationship. In recent years, commentators have suggested
that students, essentially acting as consumers, expect colleges to
provide such functions.m Moreover, courts seem to look to the
expectations of parents as opposed to those of students. Courts
perhaps are viewing parents, who often foot the expensive tuition
bill, as the true consumers of college education.
221. Id. § 207(7)(A).
222. See McEvoy, supra note 101, at 148-51.
223. See, e.g., CNN & Company, supra note 14 (discussing proposed rule to
ban student-faculty sexual relationships at University of Virginia).
224. According to § 292 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the factors
courts should consider the determining the utility of an actor's non-action when
determining negligence include: the social value of the interest protected by the
non-action; the possibility that this interest will be protected by the non-action;
and the likelihood that this interest can be protected by a less dangerous course
of conduct. RESATEmE T (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 292 (1965).
225. Anne Matthews suggested that students are demanding increased protec-
tion:
Today's students, trained as consumers from the cradle, frequently
prefer service to empowerment. In spirit if not in statute, in loco
parentis is back. The widespread attitude "I get to do whatever I
want but you have to protect me" is forcing overwhelmed, under-
financed student-life staffs and campus security forces to improvise
a new care-giving role: part concierge, part social worker, part
bodyguard.
Matthews, supra note 1, at 38, 42, 47. See also Szablewicz & Gibbs, supra note
10, at 453 ("During the 1980s, however, the college-student relationship began
to show signs of change yet again. Students began to expect their colleges to
get them jobs, provide them with tuition assistance and establish their careers.
Further, the students demanded protections [against injuries]."); Kranhold &
Farrish, supra note 14, at Al ("Students and parents ... are demanding that
colleges resume responsibility for students' drinking and sexual behavior"); see
generally DAvrD RiumAN, ON HioaHR EDUCATION: THE ACADEbIC ENTERas'sE
IN AN ERA OF RisiNG STUDENT CONtJMERISM (1981).
226. See, e.g., Katherine Farrish, Trinity's President has seen Student Protests
from Both Sides; Trinity President has Experienced Student Protests from Both
Sides, HTOR.D CouRANT, May 3, 1993, at Al. According to the Farrish
article:
Parents and students are once again demanding that colleges take
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B. Recommendation
Courts should cautiously embrace the emerging duty to super-
vise. Because duty is a fact-specific question, it is difficult to
formulate per se rules. Nevertheless, it is clear that students
deserve protection against criminal attacks, even if this demands
increased supervision. Mullins is correct in holding that such
protection is expected by parents, students, and the community
in general. In loco parentis was not abandoned so colleges could
stop taking basic measures to protect their students from violent
crime. Because the rate of student against student crime is so
high, such limited supervision is a necessary part of basic pro-
tective measures.
But cases such as Furek and Pitre envision a much greater
intrusion into the private lives of students. These cases envision
a duty to supervise students to protect them from accidents
occurring during non-school-sponsored events. Such accidents
typically result from "traditional" campus activities such as drink-
ing and fraternity and sorority hazing. It is foreseeable that many,
if not most, college students will participate in some "dangerous,"
non-school-sponsored activities. Monitoring of such activities nec-
essarily requires great levels of supervision, perhaps requiring
even monitoring of the entire student body. Thus, imposing
responsibilities to guard against accidental injuries sustained dur-
ing non-school-sponsored events should be imposed with restraint.
Imposition of broad supervisory responsibility over non-student
events certainly conflicts with the demise of in loco parentis. A
broad parental role is inconsistent with the societal factors that
gave rise to the demise of the doctrine in the first place. Univer-
sities continue to embrace the German model of education, 2 7 and
continue to educate massive amounts of students. A parental role
is especially not feasible in this context. Moreover, society con-
tinues to recognize college-aged persons as adults. There is no
reason why those members of society who choose to go to college
action in response to date rapes, crime and racial and sexual
harassment... [The president of a college,] [w]hile open to listening
to students as much as possible ... ultimately answers to trustees,
faculty and parents.
Id. See also Student Right-To-Know and Campus Security Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-542, § 202(6), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2385 (discussing
rights of parents to know information about campus crime); Mullins v. Pine
Manor, 449 N.E.2d 331, 336 (Mass. 1983) (noting expectations of parents);
CNN& Company, supra note 14 ("I'm just curious as to parents paying $8,000
to $10,000 to send their kids off to school - thinking the faculty is in loco
parentis - how they would feel if they had a vote on whether the college
faculty to get to bang the kids if the kids'll go along with it.").
227. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/10
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should be held less accountable for their own behavior. Thus,
outside of the context of crime prevention, there is no compelling
reason to justify a broad duty to supervise.
CONCLUSION
American colleges have new parental obligations. A duty to
supervise the student is emerging in the 1990s. Implicit in the
reasoning of the decisions expanding this duty is the notion that
the college acts as a custodian of its students, a throw-backto
the in loco parentis relationship.
This recent judicial expansion may reflect the societal view that
college is becoming an increasingly dangerous place for students.
This judicial trend may reflect changes in the student-college
relationship itself. Courts, however, should be hesitant to hold
colleges responsible for monitoring non-school-sanctioned activi-
ties to prevent accidents. Enforcing such a responsibility would
directly intrude on student freedom, and will unnecessarily burden
colleges. Courts should impose liability with restraint, and be
conscious of the effects that their holdings can have on the
American student-college relationship.
Philip M. Hirshberg*
* J.D. 1994, Washington University.
19941
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/10
